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Abstract. This paper considers a frictional market where buyers and sellers, with
unit demand and supply, search for trading opportunities. The analysis focuses on
explicit search frictions, allows for two-sided incomplete information, and puts no
restriction on agent heterogeneity. In this context, a non-trivial, full trade search
equilibrium is shown to exist, equilibria are characterized as the values that satisfy
the ﬁrst order conditions for a non-linear planner’s (optimization) problem, and
necessary and suﬃcient conditions are provided for the existence of eﬃcient search
equilibria under complete information. These results fully generalize to the two-
sided incomplete information setting, under an additive separability condition.
Keywords: Bargaining, Search, Matching, Two-sided Incomplete Information
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: C73, C78, D83.
1. Introduction
On an online marketplace, such as Ebay (or maybe even Google), sellers endowed
with heterogeneous objects, search for potential buyers by running auctions or post-
ing prices, in turn, buyers look for objects by browsing through listings. In the labor
market individuals who diﬀer in various dimensions try to locate jobs that comple-
ment their skills and suit their tastes. Families sort through housing options to locate
a match that fulﬁls their diverse needs. These markets share a common structure:
heterogeneous sellers try to ﬁnd an appropriate trading partner from a diverse set
of potential buyers. The Assignment Problem (see Shapley and Shubik (1972), or
Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for a more recent treatment) is the canonical model for
analyzing such markets for indivisible objects, when trade occurs in a centralized,
frictionless competitive market. However, ﬁnding a partner is most commonly a de-
centralized process that is (almost) never frictionless. Participating and remaining
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active in a marketplace, and then locating and verifying the attributes of a poten-
tial match partner, involves monetary and non-monetary (hassle) costs; these are the
explicit costs of search. The possibly large amount of time spent ﬁnding a match
partner is also an implicit cost of search. Moreover, agent’s frequently have private
information about the traded goods as well as their preferences. Asymmetric infor-
mation further exacerbates both implicit and explicit search costs since even buyers
and seller pair, with large gains from trade, may fail to trade.
There is a large body of work that uses decentralized matching and bargaining
models to analyze frictional exchange. Much research has focused on characterizing
and outlining the eﬃciency properties of equilibria in decentralized matching and
bargaining models with search frictions. (For example, Mortensen (1982), and Hosios
(1990) explore eﬃciency properties of markets with homogeneous buyers and sellers;
Sattinger (1995) focuses on the multiplicity of equilibria in a model with discounting
and heterogeneous agents; Shimer and Smith (2000) establishes existence and charac-
terize matching patterns while Shimer and Smith (2001) explores eﬃciency properties
for models with discounting and heterogenous agents). Given that ineﬃciencies may
exits with frictions, researchers have also addressed whether these models converge
to an eﬃcient, competitive market, as search frictions become small (For a homoge-
neous good Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985), Gale (1987) and Mortensen and Wright
(2002) explore convergence to a competitive equilibrium under complete information
while Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2007) extend the analysis to the two-sided in-
complete information case). However, the bulk of the previous literature focuses on
implicit time costs due to discounting rather than explicit costs of search and assumes
complete information (see Atakan (2006) and Chade (2001), for two exceptions, that
characterize matching patterns with explicit search frictions). Also, with a few excep-
tions, the models lack the full richness of the Assignment Problem in terms of buyer
and seller heterogeneity.
The analysis here focuses on explicit search frictions, allows for two-sided incom-
plete information, and puts no restriction on agent heterogeneity. Search frictions
are modeled as an additive per-period cost of search; locating a trading partner is
“fast,” but nevertheless costly. For example, in an online marketplace an agent may
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alternatively, must maintain the required technology for participating in the market-
place. There are no restrictions on preferences or endowments, except transferable
utility and unit demand/supply. Consequently, there is heterogeneity in buyer tastes,
seller costs and the good each sellers owns - the model is the frictional analogue of
the Assignment Problem. In this context, a non-trivial, full trade search equilibrium
is shown to exist. Equilibria are characterized as the set of values that satisfy the
ﬁrst order conditions for a non-linear planner’s (optimization) problem, and necessary
and suﬃcient conditions are provided for the existence of eﬃcient search equilibria
under complete information. Under an additive separability assumption, these results
generalize to the two-sided incomplete information setting where incomplete informa-
tion is modeled as a case of independent private values. Also, search equilibria are
shown to converge to a competitive equilibria under both complete and incomplete
information. However, ineﬃciencies may remain at the limit even under complete
information: the limiting competitive equilibrium can be an equilibrium for only a
proper subset of the full economy under consideration.
A description of the model is as follows: In each period a unit measure of each
type (of buyers and sellers) from a ﬁnite set of types is available for entry and those
who expect a positive payoﬀ voluntarily enter the market. The market is in steady-
state with the measure of agent types endogenously determined to balance the ﬂow
of types through the economy. Once in the market, each agent pays a per period
cost, and receives a “draw” from the distribution of active players. The probability
that any buyer (or seller) is paired with a particular type is proportional to the
frequency of that type among all sellers (buyers) active in steady state. After two
agents are paired, nature designates a proposer, the proposer makes a price oﬀer, and
the responder decides whether to trade at the oﬀered price. If a meeting between
a pair results in a trade, then the two agents are removed from the population,
otherwise the agents return to the population of active players. Eﬃciency in this
context is deﬁned by means of a planner’s problem. The planner also maintains a
steady state and is constrained by the decentralized search technology for creating
buyer-seller pairs. However, the planner can choose the measure of agents in the
market by controlling entry decisions and can choose which types consummate a
match if paired, i.e., match probabilities. Consequently, the planner maximizes per-
period production net of search costs by choosing the match probabilities and the4 ALP E. ATAKAN
steady state measure subject to the market remaining in steady state. If there are no
search costs, then the planner’s problem is equivalent to the Assignment Problem.
Search equilibria are characterized using a hypothetical planner’s problem which
may diﬀer from the actual planner’s problem only in terms of distorted buyer and
seller search costs. The central result of the paper shows, under complete information
or two-sided incomplete information satisfying an additive separability condition, the
set of search equilibrium match probabilities and steady state measures coincides with
those that satisfy the ﬁrst order conditions for the hypothetical planner’s problem.
In the model, search costs and the likelihood of proposing jointly determine the bar-
gaining strength of a buyer vis-` a-vis a seller, or alternatively, agents’ perception of
their search costs are distorted by their relative bargaining strength. If buyers and
sellers are symmetric in their bargaining strength, then search costs are undistorted,
the hypothetical problem coincides with the actual planner’s problem and an eﬃcient
search equilibrium exists.
1 If buyers and sellers diﬀer in their bargaining strengths
on the other hand, then the equilibrium is ineﬃcient: there is excess entry by the
relatively strong side of the market and insuﬃcient entry by the weak side in every
equilibrium with trade. Even when an eﬃcient equilibrium exists, there are also inef-
ﬁcient search equilibria. The planner’s problem is not convex and so search equilibria
that satisfy the ﬁrst order conditions may nevertheless fail to be optimal. This kind
of ineﬃciency stems from a lack of coordination between buyers and sellers in their
entry decisions. A trivial equilibrium where nobody enters the market always exists
and provides a stark demonstration of a failure to coordinate entry. More generally,
if agents are symmetric in their bargaining strength, then any ineﬃciency that may
remain is shown to stem from coordination failures.
As search costs become small the welfare cost of ineﬃcient entry and any ineﬃciency
due to asymmetric information disappears as the market converges to a competitive
equilibrium. Ineﬃciency due to coordination failures may remain, however, even at
the limit. Section 3.3 provides a “stable” example of a coordination failure that
results in a missing market for any level of search costs and consequently at the
limit.
2 The limit in this example is a competitive equilibrium with trade for a proper
1In the model, equal bargaining power implies that the Hosios’ Condition (see Mortensen (1982) or
Hosios (1990)) is satisﬁed in equilibrium.
2Observe that the trivial no-trade equilibrium mention above also exists for any level of search costs
and the limit is a competitive equilibrium for the empty market. This example is, however, fragile,EFFICIENT MATCHING 5
subset of the original economy. Nevertheless, the “best” search equilibrium of the
model, i.e., the equilibrium, free of coordination failures, that solves the hypothetical
planner’s problem, converges to the competitive equilibrium of the original economy
and is therefore asymptotically eﬃcient. The competitive equilibrium benchmark
under consideration is a “ﬂow” equilibrium as in Gale (1987) or Satterthwaite and
Shneyerov (2007), generalized to accommodate heterogenous goods. In each period,
ﬂow supply is the measure of sellers of a particular good entering the market and ﬂow
demand is the measure of agents willing to purchase a particular good entering the
market. In a ﬂow equilibrium, the buyer and seller continuation values, which are
the implicit prices, equate ﬂow supply to ﬂow demand for each of the goods traded
in the market.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 outlines the decentralized economy as
well as the planner’s problem, Section 3.1 presents the main results for the complete
information version of the model, Section 3.2 extends the result to the incomplete
information setting, Section 3.3 shows convergence to competitive equilibria, Section
3.4 discusses some extensions and Section 4 concludes. Proofs that are not included
in the main text are in the Appendix.
2. The Model
Buyers and sellers in the economy engage in search for possible trading partners.
Each seller owns one indivisible good for sale and each buyer wants to buy one good.
Time is taken as discrete. In each period, agents incur a positive, search cost cB ≥ 0
for a buyer and cS ≥ 0 for a seller and meet pairwise with potential partners. Either
the buyer or the seller is designated as the proposer. The probability that the buyer is
designated as the proposer is β ∈ (0,1). The proposer oﬀers a price. If the responder
accepts, then trade takes place and both agents leave the market. Agents who fail
to trade in a period return to the population and continue searching for potential
match partners. Utility is transferable. If a buyer of type b and a seller of type s
consummate their match, then they create total utility fbs which they split between
themselves.
i.e., not “stable,” since if some buyer accidently were to enter the market then some sellers would
follow and the trivial equilibrium would unravel.6 ALP E. ATAKAN
2.1. Population of Agents. B and S denote the ﬁnite sets of buyer and seller
types and I = B ∪ S the set of all types. In each period, a unit measure of each





denote the steady state measure of buyers and sellers
in the market, i.e., l ∈ R
|B|+|S|
+ . The probability for any seller of meeting buyer b
in a given period is pb = αlb/max{LB,LS}, where LB =
P
b∈B lb and α ∈ (0,1],
for expositional simplicity only take α = 1.3 Likewise, the probability of meeting
seller s is ps = ls/max{LB,LS}. In the case where li = 0 for all i ∈ I, the total
measure of pairs formed is equal to zero. These probabilities are commonly known by
all agents. In the incomplete information set-up of Section 3.2, further assume any
agent’s prior belief about his/her trading partner’s type coincides with the steady
state probabilities.
2.2. Agent Behavior and Strategies. Let σi denote a strategy for player i and
σ = (σi)i∈I a strategy proﬁle. In the ﬁrst period for agent b, the strategy determines a
probability of entering the market. Given that agent b is paired with s in the current
period, σb determines the price oﬀer t, made to agent s, if agent b is designated as
the proposer and a probability of accepting price oﬀer t, made by agent s, if b is
designated as the responder.4 The per-period reward function for a buyer b (seller s)
paired in the current period with seller s (buyer b) is:




−cB + fbs − tbs (σ)





−cS + tbs (σ)





proposal of b accepted,
proposal of s accepted,
proposal rejected,
where tbs (σ) denotes the price oﬀer made by buyer b to seller s given strategy σ. If
an agent does not enter the market or has accepted a match in a prior period, then
the agent is paired with 0, and πi (σ,0) = 0. Also, if the agent does not get paired
in a period, then she/he is paired with herself and πi (σ,i) = −ci. Buyers and sellers
3This assumption is without loss of generality and it is easily veriﬁed that all results presented in
the paper go through for any choice of α.
4The initial probability of entry and the probability of accepting an oﬀer for a certain type is
interpreted as the corresponding proportion of agents of that type playing a pure strategy.EFFICIENT MATCHING 7










where j (t) is drawn according to the steady state measure l, if there was a rejection
in period t−1. Since stationary sub-game perfect equilibria are considered, strategies
must maximize the inﬁnite sum of payoﬀs after any possible path of play.
2.3. Steady State. Given a strategy proﬁle σ, let mb ≤ 1 denote the number of buy-
ers of type b entering the market in each period. Also, let mbs denote the probability
that b and s match and leave the market, given that they are paired in a period and
b is the proposer. The market is assumed in steady state and so:
lbβ
X
s psmbs + lb(1 − β)
X
s psmsb = mb ≤ 1 ∀b and, (SS for Buyers)
lsβ
X
b pbmbs + ls(1 − β)
X
b pbmsb = ms ≤ 1 ∀s. (SS for Sellers)
These equations state that the number of type b buyers (or type s sellers) entering
the market in each period must equal the number of that type leaving the market.
Note that an agent will enter the market and search only if their value from par-
ticipating, i.e., vi, is non-negative. Also, if vi > 0, then all type i agents (equal to
measure one) will choose to participate each period.
2.4. Search Equilibrium. A search equilibrium is comprised of a mutually com-
patible strategy proﬁle σ and steady state measure l, that is, the measure l satisﬁes
the steady state equations, given that agents use strategy proﬁle σ and, each σi is
optimal after any sub-game given that agents use σ and the steady state measure is
l.
Given the stationary environment, values v = (vb,vs)b∈B,s∈S are also option values
of remaining unmatched in the economy. In any search equilibrium, a proposer will
oﬀer no more than the continuation payoﬀ to a responder. So, a buyer oﬀers seller
s no more than vs and a seller oﬀers buyer b no more than fbs − vb. Consequently,
values satisfy the recursive equations





vs = max{−cS +
X
b (1 − β)pbs
+
bs + vs,0},8 ALP E. ATAKAN
where sbs = fbs − vb − vs denotes the surplus created in a match between b and s
and s
+
bs = max{sbs,0}. In subsequent analysis, it is more convenient to deal with
the values v, matching probabilities m and the steady state measure l instead of
detailing the equilibrium strategy proﬁle σ. For notational convenience only, assume
that mbs = msb unless otherwise stated.5 The following four conditions are met by
any l, m, and v in a search equilibrium.
1. Individual Rationality. vi ≥ 0 for all i.
2. Eﬃcient Bargaining. If sbs > 0, then mbs = msb = 1 and if sbs < 0, then
mbs = msb = 0.
3. Constant Surplus. The surplus function sbs satisﬁes
β
X




bs ≤ cB for all b
(1 − β)
X




bs ≤ cS for all s
where the inequality holds with equality for i with pi > 0.
4. Steady State. li
P
j mijpj ≤ 1 and if vi > 0, then the inequality for i holds with
equality.
The Individual Rationality Condition holds since entry to the market is voluntary.
The Eﬃcient Bargaining Condition follows since in a random proposer game, any
meeting between b and s with positive surplus, results in a certain match. The
Constant Surplus Condition is a restatement of the recursive equations for buyer
and seller values. Finally, the Steady State Condition follows since if the value from
entering the economy for a certain type is strictly positive, then all potential entrants
of that type must enter the market.
As argued above if l and σ form a search equilibrium, then the implied v, l and
m satisfy Conditions 1 through 4. The following proposition gives the converse and
demonstrates that restricting attention to (v,l,m) triples is without loss of generality.
5This symmetry assumption only has bite if the agents are indiﬀerent between accepting each other.
In this case, if mbs 6= msb, then deﬁne a symmetric equilibrium with ˆ mbs = ˆ msb = βmbs+(1−β)msb.EFFICIENT MATCHING 9
Proposition 1. If l, m and v satisfy Conditions 1 through 4, then there exists a
search equilibrium l and σ where m and v are the equilibrium match probabilities and
values.
2.5. The Planner’s Problem. As a benchmark for eﬃciency, a planner’s problem
is considered. The planner maximizes the per-period total production in the steady
state economy. However, the planner is constrained by the same technology as the
decentralized market in the formation of buyer seller pairs. The planner controls
agents’ entry, exit and matching decisions. Consequently, the planner chooses the
steady state measure and the match probabilities, subject to ensuring that the market
remains in steady state. The planner’s problem is
(1)
W (I,cB,cS) = max
l,m




















mbs ≤ 1 for all s (vs) (3)
0 ≤ mbs ≤ 1 for all b and s (χbs and ωbs) (4)
li ≥ 0 for all i ∈ I = B ∪ S, (µi) (5)
where the associated Kuhn-Tucker multiplier for each constraint is given in parenthe-
sis to the right. With a slight abuse of notation, I summarizes the whole economy,
i.e., denotes the set of agents as well as the joint production function f. Also, let
W (I,cB,cS,ls) = maxˆ lb,m W (I,cB,cS,lb,ls,m) denote the planner’s problem where
the measure of sellers ls is exogenously given. The objective function, given in equa-
tion (1), is the total production per period net of search costs. Total production in a
period equals the measure of b and s matches, lblsmbs/max{LB,LS}, times produc-
tion in this match fbs, summed over all type pairs, while aggregate cost of search in
a period equals cBLB + cSLS. Constraints given by equation (2) and (3) ensure that
the number of agents of a certain type leaving the market as a result of a successful
match is less than one. The inequality need not hold with equality since the planner
can choose to have fewer than the maximum number of a particular type enter the10 ALP E. ATAKAN
market. The constraint given by equation (4) ensures that the match probabilities lie
between zero and one. Finally, equation (5) is the non-negativity constraint for the
steady state measure. If li = 0 for all i, then the above problem is not well deﬁned.
In this case, the total number of matches formed is assumed to equal zero; thus all
constraints are satisﬁed and the objective function is equal to zero.
The measure of buyers and sellers in the market must be equal in any solution to
the planner’s problem (Lemma 1 below). Since if LB > LS, then LB can be scaled
down without aﬀecting the distribution of types, and thus keeping the number of
pairs created constant while strictly decreasing the search costs. Also, using Lemma
1 to impose L = LB = LS when solving the planner’s problem ensures diﬀerentiability
and simpliﬁes the analysis.
Lemma 1. If cB > 0 and cS > 0, then in any solution to the planner’s problem
LB = LS.
For cB > 0 or cS > 0, it is straight forward to show that a solution to the planner’s
problem exists. The following proposition further shows that when cB = 0 and cS =
0, the planner’s problem is equivalent to the Assignment Problem where fractional
assignments are permitted and consequently has a solution. The Assignment Problem
is the competitive benchmark for the economy under consideration and characterizes
all the “ﬂow” competitive (and Pareto optimal) allocations for the economy.
Proposition 2. For all cB ≥ 0 and cS ≥ 0 a solution to the planner’s problem exists.
3. Main Results
3.1. Existence of Eﬃcient Equilibria. The planner’s problem provides a conve-
nient tool for proving existence and characterizing all search equilibria. Assume that





Consider a hypothetical planner’s problem W(I,cS/2(1 − β),cS/2(1 − β),l,m), i.e.,
a problem where the per period search cost for a buyer and a seller is cS/2(1 − β),
instead of cB and cS. Let F denote the set of match probabilities m, steady state
measures l and Kuhn-Tucker multipliers vb and vs, associated with equations (2) and
(3), that satisfy the ﬁrst order conditions for W(I,cS/2(1 − β),cS/2(1 − β),l,m).EFFICIENT MATCHING 11
Theorem 1 below shows that the set of search equilibria l, m and v, denoted E, are
just the elements of F, but with the measure of buyers lb multiplied by r. The
measure of buyers is increased by r since in a search equilibria the measure of sellers
and buyers in the market are not equal (Lemma 2 below), whereas in any solution to
the planner’s problem LB = LS (Lemma 1).
Lemma 2. If LS > 0, then LB/LS = r.
Proof. For lb > 0, multiplying both sides of the constant surplus condition by lb
implies that
(6) lbcB = β
X
s lbpsmbssbs.
Summing over all buyers shows that
(7) LBcB = β
X
B×S lbpsmbssbs.
Repeating the same steps for the sellers implies that
(8) LScS = (1 − β)
X
B×S lspbmbssbs.
However, lspb = lbps for all b and s, so LBCB/β = LSCS/(1−β) and LB/LS = r. 
Theorem 1 characterizes all search equilibria as the set of (l,m,v) that satisfy ﬁrst
order conditions for a non-linear program (the hypothetical planner’s problem). The
theorem also shows that a full-trade, non-trivial search equilibrium exists by proving
that the set F includes an optimizer of the planner’s problem. The planner’s problem
has an optimizer, by Proposition 2. Theorem 1 further shows the existence of Kuhn-
Tucker multipliers at any optimizer of the planner’s problem by proving that a certain
constraint qualiﬁcation holds.6
Theorem 1. The set of search equilibria E = {(l,m,v) : (l,m,v) ∈ F} and E 6= ∅.
This theorem is stated under the assumption that cb > 0 and cS > 0. If cB = cS = 0,
then r is not deﬁned and Lemma 1 is no longer valid, however Theorem 2 is still true.
In particular, if cB = cS = 0, then E = F, which follows immediately from the proof
provided for Theorem 1 in the appendix. This point is further elaborated in Section
3.3 where limiting equilibria and equilibria at the limit are discussed.
6Observe that the standard constraint qualiﬁcations do not work since the planner’s problem is not
a convex optimization problem12 ALP E. ATAKAN
In general, the problem set-up to characterize search equilibria and the actual
planner’s problem are not the same, thus search equilibria are not necessarily eﬃcient.
However, if cB/β = cS/(1 − β), i.e., if cB + cS = cS/(1 − β), then the two problems
coincide and an eﬃcient search equilibrium exists (Corollary 1 below). The bargaining
strength of an agent is jointly determined by the probability of proposing β, and search
cost c. Hence, eﬃciency requires that agents have equal bargaining power. Symmetry
in terms of bargaining power, i.e., cB/β = cS/(1−β), implies by the constant surplus
condition, that agents share equally the expected surplus from future matches. The
following corollary shows that equal bargaining power, or the symmetric division of
the surplus between buyers and sellers, is a suﬃcient condition for an eﬃcient search
equilibrium. Also, if eﬃcient matching involves trade, i.e., LS > 0 in the planner’s
problem, then cB/β = cS/(1 − β) is also a necessary condition for the existence of
an eﬃcient search equilibrium. This is because if cB/β < cS/(1 − β), in any search
equilibrium with trade, LB > LS > 0, by Lemma 2, i.e., there is excess entry by
buyers.
Corollary 1. If cB/β = cS/(1 − β), then there exists an eﬃcient search equilibrium




s vs = max(ˆ l, ˆ m,ˆ v)∈E
P
b ˆ vb +
P
s ˆ vs.
Proof. If (l,m) ∈ argmaxW(cB,cS,l,m), then (l,m,v) ∈ E by Theorem 1 and since
cS/(1−β) = cB+cS. Also, rearranging equation (8), by recalling that sbs = fbs−vs−vb
and that for vi > 0,
P





b vb = −cBLB − cSLS +
X
B×S lbpsmbsfbs
for all (l,m,v) ∈ E. Consequently,
(10) max
(ˆ l, ˆ m,ˆ v)∈E
X
b ˆ vb +
X




Even if the suﬃcient condition given in Corollary 1 is satisﬁed, there are ineﬃcient
search equilibria in addition to the eﬃcient equilibria identiﬁed above. The planner’s
problem is not a convex optimization, so a search equilibria that, by Theorem 1,
satisﬁes the ﬁrst order conditions may not be an optimizer of the planner’s problem.
This kind of ineﬃciency can be related to coordination problems. A trivial equilibrium
where nobody enters the market always exists and provides a stark demonstrationEFFICIENT MATCHING 13
of a failure between buyers and sellers to coordinate. A two buyer, two seller search
market provides a more robust failure of coordination. Let f12 = f21 = 1/5 and
f11 = f22 = 1, that is buyer 1 likes seller 1’s good and buyer 2 likes seller 2’s good.
Assume that cB = cS = c and β = 1/2. The eﬃcient equilibrium involves type 1
buyers trading only with type 1 sellers, and type 2’s trading only with other type 2’s
for small c, and for 3/10 ≥ c ≥ 2/10 requires all buyers trading with all sellers. It is
straight forward to show that there are stable ineﬃcient equilibria for all c ≤ 3/10,
where only type 1 (or only type 2) agents enter, i.e., there is a coordination failure
between sellers and buyers of type 2. These ineﬃcient equilibria remain, and remain
stable, even as search costs disappear. This point is further developed in section 3.3.
The following corollary proves that if cB/β = cS/(1 − β), then any ineﬃciency in
a search equilibrium is caused by coordination failures. More precisely, if the mea-
sure of sellers ls (or buyers lb) is taken to equal it’s search equilibrium value, then
the equilibrium measure of buyers and the equilibrium match probability is eﬃcient.
That is, the equilibrium measure of buyers, as well as the matching is eﬃcient, when
the measure of sellers is taken as exogenous. Consequently, if sellers and buyers are
symmetric in their bargaining strength, then the only source of ineﬃciency is agents
not coordinating with the opposite side of the market in their market entry decisions.
In other words, equilibrium option values are suﬃcient to coordinate matching deci-
sions for all agents and entry/exit decisions for all buyers (or for all sellers), but not
suﬃcient to jointly coordinate entry decisions for both sides of the market.
Corollary 2. Assume cB/β = cS/(1−β). If l, m and v comprise a search equilibrium,
then
(i) The steady state measure of buyers lb and the matching m is optimal given the
measure of seller ls in the market, i.e., (lb,m) ∈ argmaxlb,m W (cB,cS,lb,ls,m),
(ii) The steady state measure of sellers ls and the matching m is optimal given the
measure of buyers lb in the market, i.e., (ls,m) ∈ argmaxls,m W (cB,cS,lb,ls,m).
Lemma 2 shows that whenever the surplus is shared unevenly between buyers
and seller, that is whenever cB/β 6= cS/(1 − β), there is ineﬃcient entry into the
market, even if the search equilibrium is an optimizer to the hypothetical planner’s
problem. A two type example of a market for a homogeneous good is suﬃcient
to further demonstrate ineﬃciency due to excess or insuﬃcient entry. Consider an14 ALP E. ATAKAN
economy where high (bh) and low (bl) valuation buyers are willing to pay 1 and 1/2−
respectively for a good, while high (sh) and low (sl) cost sellers can produce the good
for 1/2+ and 0, respectively. Assume cB+cS ≤ 1/2 and β = 1/2. Eﬃciency requires
that only types bh and sl enter in each period, an equal number of buyers and sellers
are present in the market (Lemma 1), and each meeting ends in a trade. Under these
parameter values, there are two search equilibria: a trivial equilibria without trade,
and an equilibrium where only bh and sl enter and all meetings end in a trade. By
Lemma 2, lbh/lsl = cS/cB and so the equilibrium is eﬃcient only if the surplus is
shared equally between buyers and sellers, i.e., if cB = cS. Since otherwise, e.g., if
cS > cB, then lsl < lbh and there is excess entry by types bh. Instead if we assume,
cB < 1/2 < cS, then no trade is the only search equilibrium, but for cB + cS ≤ 1 the
eﬃcient conﬁguration is as before. In this search equilibrium, sellers do not receive
enough surplus with β = 1/2 and do not enter the market; thus there is insuﬃcient
entry by types sl.
The intuition of the two type example is extended to the general model in the
following corollary. Suppose that cS/1 − β > cB/β, i.e., buyers are in a stronger
bargaining position and receive more of the surplus. The corollary shows the existence
of a “best” search equilibrium that optimizes a hypothetical planner’s problem with
search costs equal to cS/(1 − β), if the measure of buyers LB is scaled down by r.
This implies that there are “too few” sellers in the market when compared to actual
planner’s problem since cS/(1−β) > cB +cS and there are “too many” buyers in the
market given the measure of sellers is LS, since LB > LS. Also, the matching and
distribution of types solve the hypothetical planner’s problem, consequently, excess
entry by buyers and insuﬃcient entry by sellers are the only sources of ineﬃciency in
the best search equilibrium.
Corollary 3. There exists (l,m,v) ∈ E such that
(lb/r,ls,m) ∈ argmaxW (cS/2(1 − β),cS/2(1 − β),l,m),









Also, LS ≤ L0
S for any (l0,m0) ∈ argmaxW (cB,cS,l,m).
Proof. If (lb/r,ls,m) ∈ argmaxW (cS/2(1 − β),cS/2(1 − β),l,m), then (lb/r,ls,m,v) ∈
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s vs = maxˆ v∈E
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b ˆ vb +
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s ˆ vs. To show LS ≤ L0
S assume to
the contrary that LS > L0
S for some (l0,m0) ∈ argmaxW (cB,cS,l,m). Optimality of






















































bsfbs > (LS − L
0
S)(cS + cB) (14)
−LS(cS + cB) +
X
B×S lspbmbsfbs > −L
0









contradicting that (l0,m0) ∈ argmaxW (cB,cS,l,m). 
3.2. Eﬃciency under Incomplete Information. Here, the results presented in
the previous subsection are extended to the case where buyers and sellers in the market
have private information under certain conditions. In the incomplete information
game, the proposer oﬀers a price and the responder chooses whether to trade. As
before, agents who trade permanently leave the market, agents who fail to trade
return to the searching population and the economy remains in steady state.
Under the assumption of the game under question, even if the proposer were al-
lowed to choose any mechanism, she would choose the same take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer
as in the case where her type is publicly known (For a detailed argument see Atakan
(2007) which adopts the development in Yilankaya (1999) to this framework). Conse-
quently, the analysis is focused, without loss of generality, on a game-form where the
proposer makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer and truthfully announces his/her type and
the responder accepts or rejects the oﬀer. A strategy σi for agent i speciﬁes a transfer
oﬀer t and the truthful announcement of her type, if i is designated as the proposer,
and a probability of accepting the price oﬀer, if designated as the responder. The
proposer can condition her oﬀer on the measure of agents in the economy l and the
observable characteristics of her partner for the period. As before, the match prob-
ability mbs denotes the probability that b and s consummate their match and leave16 ALP E. ATAKAN
the market, given that they are paired in a period and b is chosen as the proposer.
Also, as before, a search equilibrium is comprised of a mutually compatible steady
state measure l and a strategy proﬁle σ.
Private Information. A seller’s type s speciﬁes two variables: the good that
the seller has for sale, denoted xs, and the reservation value (or cost) for the seller,
denoted rs. For example, if the seller is an individual looking for a job, then xs denotes
the worker’s specialization (e.g. engineer or manager) and rs his or her disutility from
labor. A buyer’s type b also speciﬁes two variables, the buyer’s segment, denoted xb,
and the buyers reservation value, denoted rb. For example, if the buyer is a ﬁrm
attempting to hire a worker, then xb denotes the type of vacancy that the ﬁrm is
trying to ﬁll, and rb denotes the cost of making this job available or the production
the ﬁrm can achieve if it were to staﬀ the vacancy internally without hiring a new
employee. If a buyer and seller match, then they create value fbs = h(xs,xb)−rb−rs.
Continuing with the example, when worker b is hired by ﬁrm s the total value created
is given by the production achieved by hiring a worker with skill set xs for job xb,
h(xs,xb), net of the disutility from labor rs and the cost for the ﬁrm rb. In what
follows, I write hbs instead of h(xs,xb) with the understanding that hbs0 = hbs for two
sellers s and s0 who own the same good, and likewise for buyers that belong to the
same segment.
The analysis here assumes independent private values. That is, when a buyer and
seller meet the buyer observes the good that a seller has for sale, i.e., xs, while xb, rb
and rs may remain as private information. Also, assume that agents know the steady
state distribution and that any agent’s prior belief about his/her trading partner’s type
coincides with the steady state distribution of types in the economy.







pbmbs(tb,xs − rs − vs) + (1 − β)
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psmbs(hbs − tb,xs − rb − vb) + (1 − β)
X
s




where tb,xs represents the transfer oﬀer made by buyer b to a seller endowed with good
xs and ts the transfer oﬀer made by a seller.
Before proceeding further, Theorem 2 is stated. This result shows that if search
is costless, then the set of search equilibria under complete information and the set
of equilibria under incomplete information coincide. That is, incomplete information
of the independent private values variety is costly only in the presence of search
frictions. In this model, with positive search costs, asymmetric information can cause
ineﬃciencies because agents with strictly positive surplus may fail to consummate
a match, that is, bargaining between buyers and sellers may be ex-post ineﬃcient.
However, when search frictions are absent, an agent has an incentive to wait for her
favorite counterpart. This implies that the agent’s option value adjusts and leaves
no room for agreement with anybody but her favorite trading partner. Thus each
agents ends up with his/her favorite match and the bargaining in the market is ex-
post eﬃcient, given the distribution of agents and the endogenously generated outside
options.
Theorem 2. Assume that cS = cB = 0. Also assume if seller s and buyer b meet, then
xs is observed by the buyer, however xb, rb and rs are private information. The set of
search equilibrium values and measures (v and l) under complete information and the
set of search equilibria values and measures (v and l) under incomplete information
are the same.
Although the previous theorem focused on frictionless search, the main result of
this section (Theorem 3) considers general search costs cB > 0 and cS > 0. In
particular, Theorem 3 demonstrates, for any positive search cost, that the set of
search equilibrium under complete information and the set of search equilibrium under
complete information coincide, under the following assumption on the information
structure.
Assumption 1 (Additively Separable Private Information (ASP)). If seller s and
buyer b meet, then xs is observed by the buyer and xb is observed by the seller however
rb and rs are private information.
In the case of additively separable private information, a buyer knows which good
he/she is purchasing, but not the seller’s cost rs, while a seller observes the segment
of the buyer, but not his/her reservation values rb. In terms of the labor market18 ALP E. ATAKAN
example, the ﬁrm observes the skill set of the worker, but not his/her disutility from
labor, and the worker observes the type of vacancy, but not the ﬁrm’s cost. Under
ASP, the seller can also condition the transfer oﬀer ts on the segment xb of the buyer,
i.e., ts,xb.
Before stating and proving Theorem 3, two preliminary results (Lemma 3 and 4)
are needed. Lemma 3 shows that the diﬀerence between the option values of two
buyers (or sellers), who belong to the same segment (who own the same good), is
equal to the diﬀerence between their private reservation utility rb (their private costs
rs). Lemma 4 employs the ﬁnding of Lemma 3 to prove a version of Proposition 1
under ASP, i.e., that the vector (l,m,v) comprises a search equilibrium under ASP
if and only if it satisﬁes Conditions 1 through 4. Finally, Theorem 3 uses Lemma 4
and Proposition 1 to establish the equivalence between search equilibria under ASP
and search equilibria under complete information.
Lemma 3. Suppose that l, m and v satisfy Conditions 1 through 4, or alternatively
that l is the steady state measure, m and v are the match probabilities and values
associated with a search equilibrium under private information. If sellers s and s0 own
the same good (xs = xs0), then vs−vs0 = rs0−rs and thus fbs−vb−vs = fbs0−vb−vs0.
Likewise, if buyers b and b0 belong to the same segment(xb = xb0), then vb−vb0 = rb0−rb
and thus fbs − vb − vs = fb0s − vs − vb0.
Proof. Assume l, m and v satisfy Conditions 1 through 4. The Eﬃcient Bargaining
and Constant Surplus Conditions imply that the value to seller s0 under the match
probabilities mbs0 must be at least as large under mbs. This is because the match
probability mbs0 = 1, if the surplus with buyer b is strictly positive and mbs0 = 0, if
the surplus is strictly negative. Consequently,
cS ≥ (1 − β)
X
b pbmbs(fbs0 − vb − vs0) (18)
vs0 ≥
−cS + (1 − β)
P
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Thus for sellers s0 and s who own the same good
(21) vs − vs0 ≤
P
b pbmbs(fbs − fbs0)
P
b pbmbs
= rs0 − rs.
Reversing the role played by s and s0 gives
(22) vs − vs0 ≥
P
b pbmbs0(fbs − fbs0)
P
b pbmbs0
= rs0 − rs,
and consequently vs − vs0 = rs0 − rs. Also, if b and b0 belong to the same segment,
then a similar argument as above shows that vb − vb0 = rb0 − rb.
Suppose that v and m represent values and match probabilities in a search equilib-
rium under private information. Rearranging the recursive equation for seller values,
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The value of seller s0 must be at least as large as the value that this seller would get if
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Thus, vs−vs0 ≤ rs0 −rs. Exchanging the roles of seller s and s0 implies that vs−vs0 ≥
rs0 − rs and consequently vs − vs0 = rs0 − rs. A symmetric argument establishes that
vb − vb0 = rb0 − rb for any two buyers who belong to the same segment. 
Lemma 3 implies that if a buyer b accepts an oﬀer t from seller s, that is, if
vb ≤ h(xb,xs) − rb − t, then all buyers b0 from that segment should also be willing
to accept the price oﬀer, since vb0 + rb0 − rb = vb ≤ h(xb,xs) − rb − t. Likewise, if a
seller accepts an oﬀer t from buyer b, then all sellers who own the same good should
also be willing to accept this price oﬀer. Consequently, not knowing rs or rb does
not constrain a proposer when making an oﬀer. The proposer can extract all the
surplus by simply conditioning the price oﬀer on the good xs or the segment xb of
the responder. The lemma below makes this line of reasoning exact and outlines its
implications.20 ALP E. ATAKAN
Lemma 4. Assume ASP. If σ and l comprise a search equilibrium, then the equilib-
rium l, m and v satisfy Conditions 1 through 4. Conversely, if l, m and v satisfy
Conditions 1 through 4, then there exists σ such that l and σ comprise a search equi-
librium and equilibrium values are given by v.
The following theorem shows that the set of search equilibria under ASP and
search equilibria under perfect information are the same. Consequently, all results
presented for perfect information apply, without alteration, to ASP.
Theorem 3. The set of search equilibrium values and measures (v and l) under
complete information and the set of search equilibria values and measures (v and l)
under ASP are the same.
Proof. If l and σ is a search equilibrium under complete information, then by Proposi-
tion 1 the equilibrium l, m and v satisfy Conditions 1 through 4. Thus, by Lemma 4,
there exists ˆ σ such that l and ˆ σ are a search equilibrium under ASP and equilibrium
values are given by v. Conversely, if l and σ comprise a search equilibrium under
ASP, then by Lemma 4 the equilibrium l, m and v satisfy Conditions 1 - 4. Thus, by
Proposition 1, there exists ˆ σ such that l and ˆ σ comprise a search equilibrium under
complete information and equilibrium values are given by v. 
The equivalence established in Theorem 3 between search equilibria with perfect
information and search equilibria under ASP is not true in the more general inde-
pendent private values setting. Nevertheless, Theorem 2, stated and discussed at
the beginning of this section, establishes the equivalence between search equilibria
under complete and private information when there are no search friction, i.e., when
cB = cS = 0. The following proof of Theorem 2 hinges on Proposition 1 and Lemma
5 (see the appendix). Lemma 5 is an exact analog of Lemma 4 that holds under the
hypothesis of Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. If l and σ is a search equilibrium under complete information,
then by Proposition 1 the equilibrium l, m and v satisfy Conditions 1 through 4. Thus,
by Lemma 5, there exists ˆ σ such that l and ˆ σ are a search equilibrium under private
information and equilibrium values are given by v. Conversely, if l and σ comprise a
search equilibrium under private information, then by Lemma 5 the equilibrium l, m
and v satisfy Conditions 1 through 4. Thus, by Proposition 1, there exists ˆ σ such thatEFFICIENT MATCHING 21
l and ˆ σ comprise a search equilibrium under complete information and equilibrium
values are given by v. 
3.3. Convergence to a Competitive Equilibrium. This subsection argues that
search equilibria converge to competitive equilibria as search frictions disappear, that
is, any limiting equilibrium is competitive (Theorem 4 and Corollary 4). Moreover,
any search equilibria is also a competitive equilibria if there are no search frictions
(cB = cS = 0), that is, equilibria at the limit are competitive (Corollary 5).
The competitive equilibrium benchmark considered here is a “ﬂow” equilibrium as
in Gale (1987) or Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2007), generalized to accommodate
heterogenous goods. In each period, ﬂow supply is the measure of sellers of a partic-
ular good entering the market and ﬂow demand is the measure of agents willing to
purchase a particular good entering the market. In a ﬂow equilibrium, the buyer and
seller continuation values, which are the implicit prices, equate ﬂow supply to ﬂow
demand for each good traded in the market. The competitive equilibrium allocations
for economy I = B∪S is described by the following linear program which is the clas-
sical Assignment Problem where fractional assignments are permitted. As was shown
in Proposition 2, the Assignment Problem and the planner’s problem for cS = 0 and
cB = 0, i.e., maxl,m W(I,0,0,l,m), are equivalent.
The Assignment Problem involves maxq≥0
P
B×S qbsfbs subject to
P
b qbs ≤ 1 for all s
and
P




S vs subject to vs +vb ≥ fbs for all b and s. The vector qbs that solves the program
is a competitive allocation and denotes the measure of matches between b and s that
are created in each period of time. Any vector v that solves the dual program is a
competitive equilibrium utility vector and the competitive price of a traded good is
pxs = vs + rs. The ﬁrst constraint of the Assignment Problem states that the ﬂow
demand for seller of type s, i.e.,
P
b qbs, must be less than the ﬂow supply of that
type, which is at most one. This constraint will bind, if the good’s price is positive,
or more precisely, if vs > 0 and thus pxs = vs + rs > rs. The second constraint states
that the ﬂow supply to buyers of type b, must be less than the ﬂow demand by type
b, which is at most one. Again, this constraint will bind if vb > 0. Together the
constraints ensure market clearing.22 ALP E. ATAKAN
Theorem 4 and Corollary 4, presented below, consider sequences of search equilibria
(l(cn),m(cn),v(cn)) as search costs disappear (as (cn
B,cn







for all n, or in words, that the bargaining power of a buyer vis-` a-vis a seller does not
become arbitrarily large as search frictions disappear. This assumption ensures that
any sequence (l(cn),m(cn),v(cn)) is contained in a compact set and has a convergent
subsequence. This is veriﬁed in the proof of Theorem 4. So in the statements of the
results, attention is restricted, without loss of generality, to convergent subsequences.
Theorem 4 states that any sequence of search equilibria converge to a solution to
the planner’s problem with no search frictions for the economy H. Consequently,
the limiting measure of matches is a competitive allocation and the limiting vector
of values is a competitive utility vector for H. The set H is deﬁned as the set of
agents that are active in the market at the limit, i.e., the support of the limiting
measure ln → l. In general H could be a proper subset of the actual economy I. For
instance, since nobody entering the market is always a trivial equilibrium, the limit is
a trivial competitive equilibrium for H = ∅ ⊂ I and consequently the limiting search
equilibrium is ineﬃcient. The two buyer, two seller example outlined in subsection
3.1 provides a more robust demonstration of a asymptotically ineﬃcient sequence
of search equilibria. Let f12 = f21 = 1/5 and f11 = f22 = 1, that is f is super-
modular; buyer 1 likes seller 1’s good and buyer 2 likes seller 2’s good. For small
c, and at the limit, eﬃciency requires that type 1 buyers trade only with type 1
sellers, and type 2’s trade only with other type 2’s. However, there is a sequence of
stable search equilibria where only type 1 buyers and type 1 sellers enter the market.
Consequently the limit of this sequence is ineﬃcient with only the market for type
1 agents operating. Observe that for each c, the equilibrium is stable since forcing
a small measure of type 2 buyers into the market would not entice type 2 sellers to
ﬂow suit and enter.
Nevertheless, Corollary 4, shows that there always exists a sequence of search equi-
libria, in particular a sequence of the “best” search equilibria as identiﬁed by Corollary
3, that converge to the competitive equilibrium of the full economy I and are con-
sequently asymptotically eﬃcient. Therefore, Theorem 4 (and Corollary 4) shows
that ineﬃciencies caused by excess/insuﬃcient entry or by incomplete informationEFFICIENT MATCHING 23
disappear along with search friction. However, ineﬃciencies caused by coordination
failures may remain even at the frictionless limit.
Theorem 4. If (l(cn),m(cn),v(cn)) → (ˆ l, ˆ m, ˆ v), then (ˆ l, ˆ m) ∈ argmaxl,mW(H,0,0,l,m)
where H = supp(ˆ l); and vs +rs is a competitive equilibrium price vector for economy
H.
Proof. The sequence (l(cn),m(cn),v(cn)) is contained in a compact set since 0 ≤ Ln
B ≤
Ln
s ≤ ˆ r|B||S|, 0 ≤ mbs ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ v(cn) ≤ ¯ f. Thus a convergent subsequence exists.
For a proof of Ln
S ≤ ˆ r|B||S| see the appendix.
It is straight forward to show that the vector (ˆ l, ˆ m, ˆ v) satisﬁes Conditions 1 through
4 and consequently comprises a search equilibrium for I when cB = cS = 0. The fol-
lowing proves that any vector (ˆ l, ˆ m, ˆ v) satisfying Conditions 1 through 4 solves the As-
signment Problem for H and consequently is an element of argmaxl,mW(H,0,0,l,m).
I show that the measure of per-period matches ˆ qbs = ˆ mbsˆ lbˆ ps solves the Assignment
Problem and ˆ v solves the dual of the Assignment Problem, consequently, that ˆ q is a
competitive allocation and ˆ vs − rs is a competitive price vector for the economy H.
Note that ˆ q is feasible for the Assignment Problem by Condition 4. Also, ˆ v is feasible
for the dual of the Assignment Problem since, ˆ s
+











ˆ vs ≥ W
proving that W =
P
BH×SH ˆ qbsfbs. 
Corollary 4. There exists a sequence of search equilibria (ln,mn,vn) → (l,m,v) such
that
(l,m) ∈ argmaxW(I,0,0,l,m),
and consequently vs + rs is a competitive equilibrium price vector for the economy I.












for all n. Let (l,m,v) denote the (possibly subsequential) limit. By Berge’s Maximum
Theorem argmaxW (I,cn
S/2(1 − β),cn
S/2(1 − β),l,m) is a compact valued, upper-
semi-continuous correspondence. Consequently, the limit (lb/r,ls,m) ∈ argmaxW(I,0,0,l,m).24 ALP E. ATAKAN
However, since there are no search costs also (lb,ls,m) ∈ argmaxW(I,0,0,l,m). By
Proposition 2, maxl,m W(I,0,0,l,m) is equivalent to the Assignment Problem and
so the per-period measure of matches qbs = pslbmbs is a competitive allocation and
vs + rs is competitive price vector for the economy I. 
Theorem 4 (and Corollary 4) showed that search equilibria are asymptotically com-
petitive. The following corollary shows that the equilibria at the limit, i.e., when
cB = cS = 0 are also competitive. Since by Theorem 2, if cB = cS = 0, the set of
search equilibria under complete and incomplete information coincide, Corollary 5
covers both information structures.
Corollary 5. Assume cB = cS = 0. If (ˆ l, ˆ m, ˆ v) is a search equilibrium, then (ˆ l, ˆ m)
is an element of argmaxl,mW(H,0,0,l,m) where H = supp(ˆ l); and vs +rs is a com-
petitive equilibrium price vector for economy H. Conversely, if (ˆ l, ˆ m) is an element
of argmaxl,mW(I,0,0,l,m), then (ˆ l, ˆ m, ˆ v) is a search equilibrium.
Proof. Theorem 4 implies that any (ˆ l, ˆ m, ˆ v) that satisﬁes Condition 1 through 4 is an
element of argmaxl,mW(H,0,0,l,m). By Proposition 1 any search equilibrium satis-
ﬁes Condition 1 through 4 and consequently is an element of argmaxl,mW(H,0,0,l,m).
Conversely, if (ˆ l, ˆ m) is and element of argmaxl,mW(I,0,0,l,m), then (ˆ l, ˆ m, ˆ v) is a
search equilibrium by Theorem 1. 
3.4. General Matching Functions. This paper so far focused on a particular spec-
iﬁcation of the random matching process. The number of matches formed in each
period is assumed to equal min{LB,LS}. Previous literature, however, has consid-
ered a variety of matching structures. This subsection shows that the results, that
depend on the particular speciﬁcation of the random matching process (Theorem 1),
are robust to diﬀerent speciﬁcations of a matching function. Let N (LB,LS) denote
the number of matches between buyers and sellers formed in a period. The probability






i.e., the probability that the buyer ﬁnds a partner N (LB,LS)/LB, times the proba-
bility that this partner is actually seller s, ls/LS. Consequently, there are
N (LB,LS)lslb
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matches formed between buyer b and seller s in a period.
Assumption 2 (MF). The match function N : R2
+ → R+ is continuously diﬀer-
entiable, strictly concave, homogeneous of degree 1, and symmetric, i.e, N (X,Y ) =
N (Y,X).
The following theorem shows that if the buyers and sellers are symmetric in terms
of both search costs and bargaining power, then an eﬃcient equilibrium exists.
Proposition 3. Suppose that the matching function satisﬁes Assumption (MF), cB =
cS and β = 1/2. A vector (l,m,v) comprises a search equilibrium if and only
if it satisﬁes the ﬁrst order conditions for the planner’s problem. Consequently, if
(l,m) ∈ argmaxl,m W (cB,cS,l,m), then (l,m,v) comprises an eﬃcient search equi-
librium, where vb and vs are the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated with steady state
constraints of the planner’s problem.
4. Discussion and Conclusion
This paper considered a frictional market where buyers and sellers, with unit de-
mand and supply, search for trading opportunities. The analysis focused on explicit
search frictions, allowed for two-sided incomplete information. In this context, a
non-trivial, full trade search equilibrium was shown to exist, equilibria characterized
as the values that satisfy the ﬁrst order conditions for a non-linear planner’s (opti-
mization) problem, and necessary and suﬃcient conditions provided for the existence
of eﬃcient search equilibria under complete information. Under an additive separa-
bility condition, these results were shown to generalize to the two-sided incomplete
information setting. Also, search equilibria were shown to converge to a competitive
equilibria as frictions become small. However, ineﬃciencies could remain at the limit:
the limiting competitive equilibrium can be an equilibrium for only a proper subset
of the full economy under consideration. Nevertheless a sequence of search equilibria
that converges to the competitive equilibrium of the full economy was also shown to
exist.
Appendix A. Omitted Proofs
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1. Deﬁne a strategy proﬁle σ such the proposer i oﬀers
utility vj to the responder, if fij−vi−vj ≥ 0 and demands utility vi, if fij−vi−vj < 026 ALP E. ATAKAN
and the responder accepts with probability mij. Also, strategy proﬁle σ prescribes
that all agents of type i enter if vi > 0, a measure li
P
j mijpj enters if agents of that
type are indiﬀerent to entering and no agents enter if they strictly prefer not to enter.
This strategy is sub-game perfect, solves the maximization problem for each agent
and the market remains in steady state. Also, due to the constant surplus conditions,
v is indeed the value for each type implied by σ and l.
A.2. Proof of Lemma 1. I also prove that if cB ≥ 0 and cS ≥ 0, then the maximized
value of the problem with the additional constraint LS = LB, equals the maximized
value for the planner’s problem.
Assume cB > 0 and cS > 0. To show LS = LB suppose to the contrary that
LS > LB. By deﬁnition, the number of matches that can be formed between buyer
b and seller s is limited by the steady state number of matches formed between the
two types, i.e., lbls/max{LS,LB} = lbls/LS. However, scaling down the measure of
each type of seller in the market by LB/LS will leave the number of matches between
any two types b and s constant while decreasing the search costs by (LS − LB)cS and
thus showing that LS = LB at an optimum. If on the other hand cS = 0, then it is
possible that a steady state measure l with LS > LB solves the planner’s problem.
However then, the measure ˆ l obtained by scaling down the sellers by LB/LS is also
a maximizer since this scaling neither aﬀects the search costs nor the measure of per
period matches that are formed.
A.3. Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose that max{cB,cS} > 0. The maximum
number of matches formed in a period is bounded above by the maximum number of
agents entering the economy, i.e., max{|B|,|S|}. So, the maximum production in a
period is bounded by (maxb,s fbs)(max{|B|,|S|}). Consequently, any solution of the
planner’s problem must satisfy
(27) LBcB + LScS ≤ (maxb,s fbs)(max{|B|,|S|}).
Imposing the inequality LBcB + LScS ≤ (maxb,s fbs)(max{|B|,|S|}) + , with  > 0,
in addition to LB = LS to the planner’s problem ensures that the constraint set
for the planner’s problem is compact and the Weierstrass’ Theorem implies that a
maximizer exists. It is straight forward to see that any optimizer for this problem
with the additional constraints, also solves the planner’s problem. The ﬁrst additional
constraint LBcB + LScS ≤ (maxb,s fbs)(max{|B|,|S|}) +  is never binding because,EFFICIENT MATCHING 27
if it were to bind, this would imply that the maximum value is strictly negative.
However, choosing LS = LB = 0 ensures a non-negative value. Also, Lemma 1 showed
that imposing the constraint LB = LS does not aﬀect the value of the maximization
problem.
Suppose that cB = cS = 0. Let q solve







qbs ≤ 1, (29)
X
s
qbs ≤ 1, (30)
0 ≤ qbs ≤ 1. (31)
This is a well deﬁned linear program and consequently has a solution. In particular,
this is exactly the Assignment Problem. Let q solve the above linear program and pick
any l such that lbps ≥ qbs for all b and s and choose mbs to ensure that mbslbps = qbs.
The chosen m and l is feasible for the maximization problem W (0,0,l,m) hence
W (0,0,l,m) ≥ P. However, any qbs = mbslbps for (l,m) ∈ argmaxl,m W (0,0,l,m)
is feasible for the above problem so W (0,0,l,m) ≤ P. This implies that if q is
a maximizer of the above problem and mbslbps = qbs for all b and s then (l,m) ∈
argmaxl,m W (0,0,l,m) showing that argmaxl,m W (0,0,l,m) 6= ∅.
A.4. Proof of Theorem 1. The hypothetical planner’s problem can be reformu-




B×S Lpbpsmbsfbs − L
cS
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subject to
X
s Lpbpsmbs ≤ 1 for all i (vb) (33)
X
b Lpbpsmbs ≤ 1 for all j (vs) (34)
X
b pb = 1 (µB) (35)
X
s ps = 1 (µS) (36)
mbs ≤ 1 for all b and s (ωbs) (37)
mbs ≥ 0 for all b and s (χbs) (38)
pb ≥ 0 for all b (γb) (39)
ps ≥ 0 for all s (γs) (40)












































where vb, vs, ωbs, χbs, γb and γs are non-negative. The existence of a solution
(L,m,p) to the above maximization problem follows from Proposition 2. First I
show if (L,m,p,v) satisfy the ﬁrst order conditions for the maximization problem,
then lb = rpbL, ls = psL, m and multipliers vb and vs satisfy Conditions 1 through 4
and therefore comprise a search equilibrium.
The vector v is non-negative since its elements are multipliers associated with
inequality constraints and thus the Individual Rationality condition is satisﬁed.
Taking the ﬁrst order condition with respect to mbs and rearranging gives
Lpbpsfbs − Lpbpsvb − Lpbpsvs − ωbs + χbs = 0 (42)
Lpbps (fbs − vb − vs) = ωbs − χbs (FOC m)EFFICIENT MATCHING 29
Taking the ﬁrst order condition with respect to pb implies
X




s vsLpsmbs − µB + γb = 0 (43)
X




and likewise for seller s:
(FOC ps)
X




The ﬁrst order condition with respect to L is
(FOC L)
X
B×S pbpsmbs (fbs − vb − vs) =
cS
1 − β















ωbs (1 − mbs) = 0, (46)
χbsmbs = 0, (47)
γbpb = 0, (48)
γsps = 0. (49)
I show, for agents with pb > 0, equation (FOC m) and complementary slackness
conditions equations (46) and (47 ) together imply the Eﬃcient Bargaining Condition.
Assume fbs−vb−vs < 0. This implies that Lpbps (fbs − vb − vs)−ωbs < 0, consequently
χbs > 0 and thus mbs = 0. Assume that fbs − vb − vs > 0. This implies that ωbs > 0
and consequently mbs = 1.
I show that the ﬁrst order condition with respect to p and L in conjunction with
complementary slackness conditions (48) and (49) imply the Constant Surplus Con-
dition. If pb > 0, equation (48) implies that γb = 0. Consequently substituting µB/L
for
P
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and consequently µB/L =
cS
1−β. Going through the same steps for a seller shows that
µS/L =
cS
1−β. Substituting for µB and µS in (FOC pb) and (FOC ps) implies that
X
s psmbs (fbs − vb − vs) ≤
cS
1 − β
for all buyers b, (52)
X
b pbmbs (fbs − vb − vs) ≤
cS
1 − β
for all seller s. (53)
For buyers and sellers with pb > 0 and ps > 0, the previous inequalities holds with
equality. Dividing both sides or equation (80) by r shows that
P
s ps/rmbs (fbs − vb − vs) ≤
cB/β and thus the Constant Surplus Condition is satisﬁed.
By construction Lpb
P
s mbsps ≤ 1. Also, equation (44) implies that if vb > 0, then
1−Lpb
P
s mbsps = 0 and likewise for a seller. Consequently, equations (44) and (45)
imply the Steady State Condition.
Now I show if (l,m,v) is a search equilibrium, then it satisﬁes the ﬁrst order
and complementary slackness conditions for the planner’s problem. Let v be the
multipliers for the steady state constraints and let µS/L = cS/(1−β), µB/L = cB/β,
χbs = max{−sbs,0}, ωbs = max{sbs,0}, γb = cB − β
P
psmsbsbs ≥ 0 and γs =
cS − (1 − β)
P
pbmsbsbs ≥ 0. Given these deﬁnitions, it is straight forward to verify
that the ﬁrst order and complementary slackness conditions are all satisﬁed.
Finally, I show the existence of Kuhn-Tucker multipliers, that satisfy the ﬁrst or-
der conditions, at any maximizer of the planner’s problem. In order to show that
Kuhn-Tucker multipliers exists, I show that the Mangasarian-Fromovitz constraint
qualiﬁcation is satisﬁed. The Mangasarian-Fromovitz constraint qualiﬁcation can
be stated as follows: Assume x∗ solves maxx f (x) subject to inequality constraints,
gi (x) ≥ 0, i = 1,...,k, and equality constraints, hj (x) = 0, j = 1,...,m. If the
gradients of the equality constraints, i.e., ∇hj (x∗), j = 1,...,m, are linearly indepen-
dent and there exists a vector d such that ∇gi (x∗)
T d > 0 for all binding inequality
constraints and ∇hj (x∗)
T d = 0 for all equality constraints, then there exists a vector
µ 6= 0 such that ∇f (x∗) +
P
i µi∇gi (x∗) +
P
j µj∇hj (x∗) = 0 (see Bertsekas (2003)
for further detail).
In the current setting the gradient of a constraint gi is a column vector of the


































The planner’s problem has two equality constraints; 1−
P
b pb = 0 and 1−
P
s ps = 0.

















and consequently clearly linearly independent. Assume without loss of generality
that, pb1 > 0 and ps1 > 0, i.e., the non-negativity constraint is not binding for the
ﬁrst buyer and the ﬁrst seller. I will now construct the vector d. Pick the entry in
the vector d that corresponds to pb equal to ε > 0 if pb = 0 and equal to 0, if pb > 0
for all b 6= 1. Pick the entry for pb1 to ensure that ∇(1 −
P
b pb)
T d = 0. Proceed
similarly for the ps entries and consequently ∇(1 −
P
s ps)
T d = 0 Pick the entry in
d that corresponds to mbs equal to ε if mbs = 0, equal to −ε, if mbs = 1 and equal
to zero otherwise. Observe that all entries in the vector d, except d1 the entry that
corresponds to L, are now determined. The inner product between d and the gradient
of binding non-negativity constraints are equal to ε and consequently strictly positive.
Also, for a biding constraint of the form 1 − mbs ≥ 0, the inner product is also equal
to ε and consequently positive. The only constraints left to check are of the form
1−
P
b Λpbpsmbs ≥ 0 for seller s or 1−
P
s Λpbpsmbs ≥ 0 for buyer b. For example, if
























T d = −
d1
L − εA. Consequently, we can pick d1 suﬃciently
negative in order to make ∇(1 −
P
Lpbpsmbs)
T d > 0 for all b and s.32 ALP E. ATAKAN
A.5. Proof of Corollary 2. Fix ls to equal the search equilibrium measure of sellers
and consider the linear program
(58) P = max
pb,q
X







s qbs ≤ 1 for all b, (59)
X
b qbs ≤ 1 for all s, (60)
qbs − pbls ≤ 0 for all b and s, (61)
X
b pb ≤ 1, (62)
qbs ≥ 0, (63)
pb ≥ 0. (64)
Claim 1. If q and pb solve the above linear program, then any mbs deﬁned to satisfy
qbs = mbspbls, and lb = pbLS is an element of argmaxlb,m W (cB,cS,lb.ls,m).
Assume that q and pb solve the above linear program, then mbs deﬁned to satisfy
qbs = mbspbls and lb = pbLS is feasible for the maximization problem W (cB,cS,lb.ls,m),
hence maxlb,m W (cB,cS,lb.ls,m) ≥ P.
If lb,mbs ∈ argmaxlb,m W (cB,cS,lb.ls,m), then lb ≤ ls since if lb > ls we could
scale the measure of buyers down without eﬀecting the value. This implies that
pb = lb/LS and qbs = mbspbls is feasible of the above linear program and so P ≥
maxlb,m W (cB,cS,lb.ls,m). Showing that P = maxlb,m W (cB,cS,lb.ls,m) and proving
the claim.
Claim 2. The search equilibrium distribution of buyers pb and measure of matches
qbs = mbspbls solves the linear program.
The search equilibrium proportion of buyers pb and measure of matches qbs =
mbspbls is feasible for the above program consequently
P
B×S mbspblsfbs − LScB ≤ P.
The dual to the above linear program is as follows:
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subject to
νb + νs + ωbs ≥ fbs for all b and s, (66)
µ −
X
s lsωbs ≥ −cBLS for all b, (67)
νi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ I, (68)
ωbs ≥ 0 for all b and s. (69)
The search equilibrium values vb, vs, the surplus s
+
bs = max{fbs − vs − vb,0} and
µ = cSLS are feasible for the dual since vb + vs + s
+
bs ≥ fbs for all b and s and due to








bs ≤ (cB + cS)LS =
cB
β LS for all








s vs + cSLS =
P
B×S mbspblsfbs − cBLS ≥ D = P. This implies that
P
B×S mbspblsfbs − cBLS = P
showing that the search equilibrium distribution of buyers pb and measure of matches
qbs = mbspbls solves the linear program.
Deﬁne lb = pb
P
s ls. Claim 1 and Claim 2 together imply that
(70) (lb,m) ∈ argmaxlb,mW (cB,cS,lb.ls,m).
The argument for (ls,m) ∈ argmaxls,m W (cB,cS,lb.ls,m) is symmetric.
A.6. Proof of Lemma 4. Suppose that l, m and v satisfy Conditions 1 through 4.
I show that there exists a search equilibrium (σ,l) where values are given by v and
the match probabilities by m.
Deﬁne a strategy proﬁle σ as follows: Let the number of agents of type i entering
the economy equal li
P
j pjmij. The proposer truthfully announces his/her type to
the responder and makes a transfer oﬀer. For a buyer b let the transfer oﬀer made to
a seller of good ˆ x
tb,ˆ x = vs0 + rs0, if fbs0 − vb − vs0 ≥ 0, and (71)
tb,ˆ x = hbs0 − rb − vb, if fbs0 − vb − vs0 < 0, (72)
where s0 is any seller with xs0 = ˆ x. By Lemma 3, vs0+rs0 = vs+rs and fbs0−vb−vs0 =
fbs − vb − vs for all sellers s0 and s who own the same good ˆ x. For a seller s let the34 ALP E. ATAKAN
transfer oﬀer made to any buyer who belongs to segment ˆ x
ts,ˆ x = hb0s − rb0 − vb0, if fb0s − vs − vb0 ≥ 0, and (73)
ts,ˆ x = vs + rs, if fb0s − vs − vb0 < 0, (74)
where b0 is any buyer with xb0 = ˆ x. Again by Lemma 3, hb0s −rb0 −vb0 = hbs −rb −vb
and fb0s − vs − vb0 = fbs − vb − vs for all buyers b0 and b who belong to the same
segment ˆ x. Let buyer b accept an oﬀer from a seller s with probability msb and the
seller accept an oﬀer from the buyer with probability mbs.
The strategy proﬁle σ deﬁned above and l is compatible with a steady state since
the match probabilities that I used to deﬁne this strategy proﬁle, satisfy the Steady
State Condition by assumption. Since a buyer matches with any seller with whom
she has positive surplus and extracts all the rent when she is a proposer and gets
her continuation value when she is responder, her decisions are optimal, and likewise
for sellers. Thus no agent has an incentive to deviate from the prescribed strategies.
Also, since the revelation of type does not aﬀect the matching decision when the
surplus is strictly positive, the proposers do not have an incentive to misreport.
Now I show that if σ and l is a search equilibrium under ASP , then l, m and
v satisfy Conditions 1 through 4. Observe that the strategy proﬁle σ is available to
agents under complete information. Since l, m and v are compatible with equilibrium,
values satisfy the Individual Rationality Condition and match probabilities and the
steady state measure satisfy the Steady State Condition.
By Lemma 3, a proposer can extract all surplus from a responder by conditioning
only on the responder’s segment, if the responder is a buyer, and conditioning only
on the good, if the responder is a seller. If sbs = fbs − vs − vb > 0, then since the
proposer can extract all the surplus, a meeting between such a pair must result in a
certain match, i.e., mbs = 1. Also, if sbs < 0, then the oﬀer made by the proposer can
not satisfy the responder and thus mbs = 0. Consequently, the Eﬃcient Bargaining
Condition holds.
By the reasoning in the previous paragraph, if sbs > 0, then ts,xb = hbs − rb − vb




−cS + (1 − β)
X
b








psmbs(hbs − rs − vs − rb − vb) + vb,0
)
, (76)
and rearranging shows that the Constant Surplus Condition holds.
A.7. Proof of Theorem 2.
Lemma 5. Assume that cS = cB = 0. Also, assume if seller s and buyer b meet, then
xs is observed by the buyer, however xb, rb and rs are private information. If σ and
l comprise a search equilibrium, then the equilibrium l, m and v satisfy Conditions 1
through 4. Conversely, if l, m and v satisfy Conditions 1 through 4, then there exists
σ such that l and σ comprise a search equilibrium and equilibrium values are given
by v.
Assume l, m and v satisfy Conditions 1 through 4. I outline strategy ˆ σ such that ˆ σ
and l comprise a search equilibrium under private information where values are given




pjmij(fij − vi − vj) = 0
for all i and the Eﬃcient Bargaining Condition implies that if mbs > 0, then fbs −
vb − vs ≥ 0. Consequently, fbs − vb − vs ≤ 0 for all b and s, and fbs − vb − vs =
hbs − rs − rb − vb − vs = 0 for b and s with mbs > 0.
Deﬁne strategy ˆ σ such that a seller, when chosen as the proposer, proposes to sell
their good for t = vs + rs and truthfully announce his/her type s to the responder.
The buyer responds by accepting the oﬀer with probability msb. By Lemma 2, all
sellers endowed with the same good propose the same transfer. Also, the speciﬁed
transfer is the highest amount any buyer would be willing to pay for the particular
good, given values v. Consequently, the seller has neither an incentive to misrepresent
her type nor to deviate from the prescribed transfer oﬀer. Also, a buyer cannot gain
by deviating, since for a buyer with msb > 0, the proposed transfer leaves the buyer
indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting.36 ALP E. ATAKAN
When a buyer proposes, he/she oﬀers to pay t = hbs−rb−vb and announces his/her
type b truthfully. The seller responds by accepting with probability mbs. Observe that
all buyers who have a non-negative surplus with seller s, oﬀer the same transfer and
this is the lowest transfer that will be accepted by any seller who owns the same good
as seller s. Moreover, the buyer cannot get more surplus than under the speciﬁed
transfer oﬀer, given values v. Consequently, the buyer has neither an incentive to
misrepresent her type nor to deviate from the prescribed transfer oﬀer. Also, a seller
cannot gain by deviating, since for a seller with mbs > 0, the proposed transfer leaves
the seller indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting.
Since the matching probabilities and the steady state measure satisfy the Steady
State condition, the market is in a steady state. Also, using the strategies above
implies that the values are given by v since the transfers and acceptance decisions are
identical to the full information case.
I show equilibrium l, m and v satisfy Conditions 1 through 4. The Individual
Rationality and the Steady State Conditions are obviously satisﬁed. The Bellman




pbmbs(tb,xs − rs − vs) + (1 − β)
X
b




psmbs(hbs − tb,xs − rb − vb) + (1 − β)
X
s
psmsb(hbs − ts − rb − vb) (79)
Consequently, if mbs > 0, then tb,xs − rs − vs = 0 and hbs − tb,xs − rb − vb = 0, also if
msb > 0, then hbs − ts − rb − vb = 0 and ts − rs − vs = 0. Substituting gives
0 = (1 − β)
X
b




psmbs(hbs − rs − vs − rb − vb) (81)
showing that the Constant Surplus Condition is satisﬁed.
To show that the Eﬃcient Bargaining Condition holds, I show that fbs−vs−vb ≤ 0
for all b and s. Assume that there exists a pair b and s such that fbs − vs − vb > 0.
Then the proposer can demand vi +  while ensuring the acceptance by giving the
responder vj+. The proposer will always do so in a perfect equilibrium consequently
mij = 1. However, this contradicts the Constant Surplus Condition that was shown
to hold in equilibrium since the pair b and s meet with strictly positive probability.EFFICIENT MATCHING 37






qbs ≤ pbpsL (83)
X
pb = 1 (84)
X
ps = 1 (85)
where qbs is a ﬁxed and equals the number of b and s matches that are formed in a
search equilibrium, i.e., qbs = mbspbpsL. Showing that search equilibrium p and L solve
the problem is immediate since the surplus values s, p and L satisfy the ﬁrst order
conditions, the inequality constraints are quasiconcave and the equality constraints
as well as the maximized function are linear. However, observe that pb = 1
|B|, ps = 1
|S|
and L = |B|×|S| is always a feasible option. Consequently, 2cL ≤ 2c(|B| × |S|) and
hence L ≤ |B| × |S|.
A.9. Proof of Proposition 3. The Lagrangian for the problem is








































The concavity of N implies that LB = LS. I show that any vector (l,m,v) that
satisﬁes the ﬁrst order conditions also satisfy Conditions 1 through 4. The ﬁrst order
conditions with respect to m is
(87) N (LB,LS)pbps (fbs − vb − vs) = ωbs − χbs.
This ﬁrst order condition implies the Eﬃcient Bargaining Condition. The ﬁrst order
conditions with respect to pb is
(88) N (LB,LS)
X
s psmbs (fbs − vb − vs) = µB − γb38 ALP E. ATAKAN
and likewise for ps
(89) N (LB,LS)
X
b pbmbs (fbs − vb − vs) = µS − γs
The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to LB and LS are
(90) NB (LB,LS)
X
B×S pbpsmbs (fbs − vs − vb) = c
(91) NS (LB,LS)
X
B×S pbpsmbs (fbs − vs − vb) = c
Substituting gives µB =
N(LB,LS)
NB(LB,LS)c and µS =
N(LB,LS)
NS(LB,LS)c. Also, the ﬁrst order condi-
tions with respect to LB and LS imply NB (LB,LS) = NS (LB,LS). Also by the ﬁrst











Because N is homogeneous of degree 1, NB (LB,Ls)LB+NS (LB,LS)LS = N (LB,LS)










s psmbs (fbs − vb − vs) ≤ 2c
for all b and with equality for pb > 0. This shows that the Constant Surplus Condition
is satisﬁed. Observe the Individual Rationality Condition and Steady State Condition
are automatically satisﬁed. The existence of the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers follows from
the same argument as the one provided for Theorem 1 in the appendix.
Proving that any search equilibrium (l,m,v) satisﬁes the ﬁrst order and comple-
mentary slackness conditions for the planner’s problem is analogous to Theorem 1.
Observe that Lemma 2 is valid under the matching speciﬁcation N and so L = LB =
LS Let v be the multipliers for the steady state constraints and let µS/L = c/2,
µB/L = c/2, χbs = max{−sbs,0}, ωbs = max{sbs,0}, γb = c − 1
2
P
psmsbsbs ≥ 0 and
γs = c − 1
2
P
pbmsbsbs ≥ 0. Given these deﬁnitions, it is straight forward to verify
that the ﬁrst order and complementary slackness conditions are all satisﬁed.EFFICIENT MATCHING 39
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